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Discriminatory Membership Policies in Federally
Chartered Nonprofit Corporations
J. lNTRODUCTWN
Since 1791 the United States has created federal corporations by
specific acts of Congress.1 These corporations fall into three general
types, 2 including corporations organized in the District of Columbia,8 corporations that carry out a federal governmental or public
function,4 and private nonprofit corporations that undertake educational, charitable, historical, cultural or similar purposes. About fifty
groups comprise the third category, including the American National
Red Cross, 5 the Girl Scouts of America, 6 the Boy Scouts of America,7
the United States Olympic Committee,8 the American Legion,ll the
Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW),1° and the
Little League.11
I. The first charter was to establish the Bank of the United States. Act of Feb. 25,
1791, ch. 10, § 3, l Stat. 192.
2. See R. POLING, CORPORATIONS CHARTER£0 BY Ac:r OF CONGRESS 2 (Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress ed. 1973).
3. Corporations organized in the District of Columbia include the whole gamut
of organizations typically chartered by a state, such as gas and water companies (e.g.,
Georgetown Gaslight Co., created by Act of Jnly 20, 1854; ch. 98, §§ 1-12, 10 Stat.
786), cemeteries (e.g., Prospect Hill Cemetery, created by Act of June 13, 1860, ch. 122,
§§ 1-12, 12 Stat. 32), educational institutions (e.g., Howard University, created by Act
of March 2, 1867, ch. 162, §§ 1-10, 14 Stat. 438), hotels (e.g., Capitol Hotel Co.,
created by Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 123, §§ 1-5, 13 Stat. 539), and insurance companies
(e.g., Mutual Investment Fire Insurance Co. of the District of Columbia, created by
Act of Jan. 28, 1905, ch. 285, §§ 1-16, 33 Stat. 622). Congress acts as a local legislature
when incorporating business organizatio1,ci, now following the standard state procedure of allowing incorporation by the filing of appropriate papers. See D.C. CoDE
ANN., § 29-201 (1973).
4. This category includes, for instance, banks (e.g., Bank of the -United States,
created by Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 269), railroads (e.g., National
Railroad Passenger Corp., created by the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-519, §§ 301-08, 84 Stat. 1327), the Federal Deposit Insurance Co. (created
by the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 12B, 48 Stat. 168), and the Tennessee Valley
Authority (created by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, cl>. 32, §§ 1-30, 48
Stat, 58). There is no statutory procedure for incorporating ori"lnizations in this
category. Charters are granted on a case-by-case basis.
5. 36 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970) (incorporated 1905).
6. 36 U.S.C. §§ 31-39 (1970) (incorporated 1950).
7. 36 U.S.C. §§ 21-29 (1970) (incorporated 1916).
8. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-83 (1970) (incorporated J950).
9. 36 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1970) (incorporated 1919).
10, 36 U.S.C. §§ lll-20 (1970) (incorporated 1936).
11. Act of July _16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, §§ 1-18, 78 Stat. 325. Additional ~amples include the Agricultural Hall of Fame (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 971-88
(1970)), the Future Farmers of America (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 271-91 (1970)),
and the American Veterans of World War II (charter codified at 36 U.S.C. §§ 67-67s
(1970)).
Unlike states, which typically provide a simple statutory procedure for incorporation
of nonprofit groups, the Federal government creates national nonprofit corporations
only· by specific acts of Congress. A bill is introduced in one of the houses and is
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Recently, the discriminatory membership policies of some of
these nonprofit organizations have aroused interest. The Boy Scouts,
for example, maintain that "no boy can grow into the best kind of
citizen without recognizing his obligation to God," 12 and therefore
refused to initiate a ten-year-old boy as a member of a Cub Scout
pack because he had stricken the word "God" from the Scout Promise
on his application. 13 The Little League and the VFW have also invited attention; recent suits have been brought against both organizations challenging their practice of limiting membership to men.14
then assigned to a committee. In the Senate, the bill usually goes to the Judiciary
Committee's subcommittee on Federal Charters, Holidays, and Celebrations. In the
House, it goes to either the Judiciary Committee or the Committee on the District of
Columbia. Once passed by both houses and signed by the president, the charter is a
public law and is usually encoded in Title 36 of the United States Code-Patriotic
Societies and Observances. The charter typically contains the name of the corporation
and the incorporators, the purposes of the organization, a designation of a principal
office and a requirement of an agent to receive service of process, conditions for
membership, and an enumeration of the corpc,:ate powers, typically including tl1e
power to sue and be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire, hold and
convey property, to make bylaws, to h;,.ve a seal, and to appoint officers,
Although the issue has never been raised, there exists a theoretical problem of
finding constitutional authority for congressional incorporation of certain nonprofit
organizations. Because incorporation is not authorized by an c.-.:press constitutional
provision, its validity depends upon whether it is "necessary and proper" to the cXer•
cise of a delegated power. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Incorporation of a veterans' organization may be justified as deriving from Congress's
power to regulate military affairs, but the delegated power supporting incorporation
of groups such as the Little League and the Girl Scouts is unclear. Altllough Congress
has the power "To ••• provide for the ••• general Welfare of the United States,"
U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, this clause is read as only a qualification of tlle taxing
power. See, e.g., U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The commerce clause may provide
autllority in certain cases, but it is diffirult to see how a group such as the Little
League "affect[s] commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
Uncertainty concerning legislative authority also characterizes private bills, to
which federal charters bear considerable resemblance. In addition, both lack the
generality normally expected of legislation, both lack statutory definition and procedure, and botll present intractable equal protection problems. See Note, Private
Bills in Congress, 79 HARV, L. REv, 1684, 1686 (1966):
[U]nanswered problems related to the notion of "equal protection" are raised
when an individual denied a bill is in all relevant respects in tlle same position
as one for whom a bill has been passed•••• Because there is no appeal from
amgressional rejection, and because Congress sheds so little light on its enactment
of private legislation, it is impossible to determine whetller tllere is truly like
treatment in like cases.
These probiems, however, are beyond tlle scope of this Note.

,

12. Statement of Executive Board, Pine Tree Council, Boy Scouts of America, Portland, Maine, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, at 60, col. 4 (late city ed.).
13. ld,
14. The suits against the Little League have been brought on a number of tlleorJcs.
In King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Civil Action No. 40304 (E.D. Mich. July 6,
1973), appeal docketed, No. 73-1940, 6tll Cir., Sept. 14, 1973, tlle plaintiff brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1970), alleging tllat her rights to equal protection under the fiftll and fourteenth amendments had been infringed, Her claim
of "governmental action" was based on the Little League's extensive use of public
facilities and the existence of a federal charter. The plaintiff also sought a
declaration that tlle charter did not prohibit girls from competing. See Complaint at
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While it is not clear that any federally chartered groups presently
practice racial discrimination, several organizations have done so in
the past.15
These controversial practices raise the question of whether judicial remedies exist for persons discriminatorily denied membership
in federally chartered organizations. Traditional judicial response
has been a reluctance to interfere with the policies of private associations, particularly where membership benefits are primarily social
rather than economic. Therefore, if constraints on membership
policies of federally chartered groups are to be found, they must flow
from the charter itself. This Note will propose two theories by which
such constraints may be derived, both of which rely heavily on the
unique nature of a federal charter as an expression of official ac~laim
for an exemplary group. The first theory requires that the incorporating statute be read in light of federal public policy and construed not
to require, and in fact to prohibit, discrimination inconsistent with
federal policy. The second approach invokes the constitutional doctrine of governmental action. There is clearly sufficient governmental
involvement to impose constitutional prohibitions if the statute chartering the group mandates the challenged membership policy. Even
2, King v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Civil Action No. 40304 (E.D. Mich. July 6,
1973). The court dismissed the suit for lack. of jurisdiction, finding insufficient evidence of governmental action. It- did not address the question of charter interpretation.
Another case treating these issues similarly is Wachs v. Newton Little League, No. 721300 (E.D. Mass. May 17, 1972) (unreported case). A different theory proved successful
in National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Dock.et No. A1313-73 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. March 29, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 10588, N.J.
Sup. Ct. May 7, 1974), where the plaintiffs based their challenge on a violation of a state
statute prohibiting se.'s discrimination by operators of "public accommodations." The
court upheld a determination by the State Division on Civil Rights finding the Little
League to be a public accommodation, and did not agree with the defendant's position that the Little League's federal charter prohibited female participation and
hence preempted regulation by state law. The Little League cases may now be mooted
because of the recent decision of the League's board of directors to allow girls to participate, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1974, at 25, col. 3-8 (late city ed.). However, cases involving issues such as the propriety of the Little League's expulsion of a boy for hair
length may still arise. See Wirkus v. Union Little League, Inc., Dock.et No. C-4158-72
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. March 19, 1974) (default judgment against Little League).
Sex discrimination by the VFW was challenged on statutory and constitutional
grountls in Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1973), revd., No. 73-1197
(D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974). See note 97 and text accompanying notes 110-17 infra for
discussion of the case.
15. See, e.g., Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 14 S.2d 225 (1943); Hearings on Corporation Charter Bills Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judidary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 34-36 (1946), referring to racially discriminatory policies
of the American Legion and the VFW. Also, the American National Red Cross segregated its blood bank until 1950. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1950, at 7, col. 1 (late city ed.).
The abandonment of the practice was probably influenced by public criticism. See,
e.g., Editorial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1950, at 24, col. 3 (late city" ed.); Id., April 2,
1943, at 15, col. 3 (late city ed.) (reporting criticism by the Quakers); Id., March 25,
1943, at 20, col. 3 (late city ed.) (reporting criticism by the Interracial Committee of
the Women's Division of the Greater New York Federation of (?hurches).
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if the charter does not require the discrimination, the grant of a
federal charter alone may be sufficient to characterize the group's
practices as governmental action and therefore subject to constitutional constraints.
II. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Courts generally have been reluctant to interfere with the membership policies of private nonprofit associations. 16 However, they are
more willing to intervene when expulsion of a member is challenged
than when exclusion of an applicant is involved. Membership status
in expulsion cases has been protected under a variety of legal theories,
including property,17 contract,18 and tort.19 Whatever the nature of
the right, three tests are applied to judge the propriety of the expulsion: "(1) [T]he rules and proceedings [of the association] must not
be contrary to natural justice; (2) the expulsion must nave been in
accordance with the rules; (3) the proceedings must have been free
from malice (bad faith)."20 The "natural justice" principle, which
Chafee terms an "unwritten 'due process' clause,"21 is used to examine the procedural and substantive adequacy of the association's
rules. Thus, the expulsion process must afford at least notice 22 and an
opportunity to defend.23 Furthermore, a member must not be expelled
for violating a rule that is contrary to law or public policy; that is, the
rule may neither itself violate the law or require a member to do so,
nor "[prohibit] or [inhibit] the performance by the individual of a
duty or function for the performance of which the state normally
16. Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARV. L, REv,
993, 996 (1930), Chafee uses the word "associations" to include nonprofit groups
generally, whether incorporated or not. A similar practice will be followed here.
17. Fussell v. Hail, 233 Ill. 73, 84 N.E. 42 (1908); Heaton v. Hall, 51 App. Div,
126, 64 N.Y.S. 279 (1900).
18. Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613, 50 Pac. 763 (1897); Krause v. Sander, 66 Misc.
601, 122 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
19. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904); Schlesinger v. Quinto, 201 App, Div,
487, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922).
20. Chafee, supra note 16, at 1014.
21, Id, at 1015.
22. See, e.g., Nametra, Inc. v. American Soc. of Travel Agents, Inc., 28 Misc. 2d
291, 211 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Harmon v. Mathews, 27 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct,
1941); In re Gallaher v. American Legion, 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), affd,
mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 271 N.Y.S. 1012 (1934); Slanina v. Greek Catholic Union of
Russian Bhds. of U.S.A., 153 Pa. Super. 298, 33 A.2d 807 (1943). See also Chafee,
supra' note 16, at 1016; Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of
Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REv. 983, 1028-29 (1963) [hereinafter Private Associations].
, 23. An opportunity to defend generally means a hearing, but the requirement
varies according to the nature of the association, the issues involved, and the poten·tial harm to"the individual. See, e.g., Nametra, Inc. v. American Soc. of Travel Agents,
Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 291, 211 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Harmon v. Mathews, 27
N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Private Assodations, supra note 22, at 1029.
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relies on individual initiative."24 The former requirement means
that an organization, for example, cannot require that a member disobey a court order25 or buy illegally adulterated coffee.26 The latter
requirement ensures that "[t]he role of the member as a responsible
citizen-voter, witness, petitioner to the legislature-is protected."27
The early New York case of In re Gallaher v. American Legion28
illustrates the above principles in the federal charter context. An
American Legion post and its members sought a writ of mandamus
to compel restoration of its charter, which had been revoked for a
violation of a Legion regulation prohibiting a post from publicly
opposing any position taken by the national organization. The court
granted the writ, holding that there were both procedural and substantive defects in the expulsion. First, the court found the failure
to apprise post officers of the charges against them to be contrary to
"settled principles of law." 29 Whether or not the Legion's rules or
bylaws so provided, "notice of the charges and a reasonable opportunity to be heard is always required ...." 3° Fur~ermore, the expelled post had not been granted the right of appeal afford~d under
the Legion's bylaws. Substantively, the court held that the regulation
unreasonably inhibited the "fundamental right" to "publish [one's]
sentiments on all subjects," 31 and therefore was "opposed to the spirit
if not the very letter of our State Constitution and our Federal Constitution."32 Concluding that the' regulaton was "contrary to law,
unsound in principle, and out of harmony with the noble ideals for
which this fine organization was founded," 83 the court expressly relied on the doctrine that "[b]y-laws and regulations of associations
must be reasonable and not contrary to law or to public policy." 34
By forbidding the Legion to expel members for publicly opposing
the payment of a soldiers' bonus, the holding may illustrate the traditional protection of a citizen's right to advocate a position on legislation, in accordance with Chafee's "unwritten 'due process' clause"85
for expulsion cases. However, the case may be read more broadly.
24. Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1029.
25. Nissen v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 229 Iowa 1028, 295 N.W. 858 (1941).
26. In re Lurman, 90 Hun 303, 35 N.Y.S. 956 (Sup. Ct. 1895), affd., 149 N.Y. 588,
44 N,E. 1125 (1896).
27. Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1029.
28. 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), affd. mem., 242 App. Div. 604, 27_1 N.Y.S.
1012 (1934).
29. 154 Misc. at 283, 277 N.Y.S. at 83.
30. 154 Misc. at 283, 277 N.Y.S. at 83.
31. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85.
32. 154 Misc. at 284, 277 N.Y.S. at 85.
33. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85.
3-f. 154 Misc. at 285; 277 N.Y.S. at 85.
35. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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The facts do not clearly involve the right to petition the government
in support of legislation. Moreover, the court's reference to the first
amendment and its statement that the expulsion "transcend[ed] the
powers granted to the Legion by the act of Congress incorporating
it"36 suggest that the case was decided not upon traditionally narrow public policy grounds, but by the use of federal public policy,
in part defined by the federal constitution, as an indicator of congressional intent in granting a federal charter. This theory of adjudication will be fully explored below.37
Courts have been more reluctant to interfere with the exclusion
of applicants from membership, 38 particularly in cases involving social groups. In Trautwein v. Harbourt 39 plaintiffs sought damages
for malicious exclusion from the Order of the Eastern Star, a fraternal organization. The New Jersey court, distinguishing expulsion
cases, cases in which membership is an economic necessity, and cases
in which the organizations are "repositories of civic, civil or political
rights," 40 concluded that
there is no "abstract right to be admitted" to membership in a volun•
tary association ...• The general rule is that there is no legal remedy
for exclusion .•. no matter how arbitrary or unjust ...•
• . • Moluntary associations generally have the ·unquestionable
right to exclude from membership on any basis whatever.41

Courts have been more willing to intervene where the organization is one in which denial of membership has important adverse
economic ·effects. Though they have occasionally relied on a state
action theory, 42 the more common ground is a concern for the association's exercise of "quasi-governmental power."43 In Falcone v.
Middlesex County Medical Society, 44 for example, the New Jersey
supreme court found that the defendant had a monopoly of power
36. 154 Misc. at 284, 277 N.Y.S. at 85.
37. See Part Ill infra.
38. See, e.g., Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 556-57, 14 S.2d 225, 227•28
(1943); Mayer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Assn., 47 N.J. Eq, 519, 524, 20 A. 492, 494
(Ch. 1890).
39. 40 N.J. Super. 247, 123 A.2d 30 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 22 N.J. 220,
125 A.2d 233 (1956).
40. 40 N.J. Super. at 264-65, 123 °A.2d at 39,
41. 40 N.J. Super. at 260, 267, 123 A.2d at 37, 41, quoting Mayer v. Journeymen
Stonecutters' Assn., 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 A. 492, 494 (Ch. 1890).
42. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Soc., 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966). See also
Private Associations, supra note 22, at 1040.
43. Other theories argued occasionally, but less successfully, are antitrust violation
(state and federal) and tortious economic injury. See Note, Judicially Compelled 11.d•
mission to Medical Societies: The Falcone Case, 75 HARV, L. R.Ev. 1186 (1962).
44. 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
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over local hospital facilities, and stated that "[p]ublic policy strongly
dictates that this power should not be unbridled but should be
viewed judicially as a fiduciary power to be exercised in reasonable
and lawful manner for the advancement of the interests of the medical profession and the public generally." 45 Since Falcone, courts have
begun to insist that, in cases where membership in an association is
a practi,cal necessity (cases involving professional societies and unions,
for example), an applicant is entitled to a hearing embodying the
elements of due process and can be rejected only for good cause.46
Though Falcone illustrates a judicial willingness to confront arbitrary exclusion from membership, its applicability in federal charter cases is questionable. Most federally chartered groups do not
wield the economic power over an individual necessary for judicial
intervention. Furthermore, although In re Gallaher indicates that
courts will protect an established membership right that is threatened by expulsion, such protection may be of little practical significance because al}Y groups determined to bar certain persons can
discriminate ab initio, thus avoiding the need for expulsion. Traditional judicial .response, then, is inadequate to deal with most discriminatory membership policies of federally chartered groups. If
one is to find constraints on such policies, one must look to the federal charter itself, finding constraints either as a matter of statutory interpretation or as a result of the constitutional theory of governmental action.

Ill. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The doctrine that voluntary associations have an absolute right
to deny membership to applicants is applied whether or not the association is incorporated, unless the incorporating charter "imposes
a clear obligation on the corporation to admit certain persons to
membership." 47 Determining the circumstances in which a federal
charter imposes such an obligation is thus of central importance.
In Chapman v. American Legion48 the plaintiff argued that the
Legion was obligated to admit him if he met the membership re45. 34 N.J. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
46. See Blende v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 96 Ariz. 240, 245, 393 P.2d 926,
930 (1964) (In assessing good cause courts should consider "the social value of the goal
of the O Society's action; the appropriateness of the Society as a means for achieving
the goal; and the reasonableness of this particular action of the Society in relation
to the goal."); Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P .2d
495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969). The doctrine that an organization's quasi-public position imposes certain restrictions against arbitrary exclusion has also been used in
union cases in which membership was denied on the basis of race. See Thorman v.
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 49 Cal. 2d 629, 320 P.2d 494
(1958); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944),
47. Chapman v. American Legion, 244 Ala. 553, 557, 14 S.2d 225, 228 (1943).
48. 244 Ala. 553, 14 S.2d 225 (1943).
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quirements set forth in the Legion's charter. The court rejected the
claim, holding that, though the charter prescribed membership qualifications in terms of military record only, it could not be implied that
all who met the qualifications could become members. 49 To the same
effect is Reiter v. American Legion, 50 where the court held that the
provision of the Legion charter limiting membership, in effect, to
veterans of the first or second world wars was "manifestly merely a
restriction upon eligibility, . . . in no wise limit[ing] the inherent
power of the organization to adopt additional criteria of eligibility
having a reasonable relation to its statutory purpose and not contrary
to public policy." 51 Though Chapman and Reiter dealt only with the
American Legion charter, that charter is typical of others. The cases
thus suggest that a federal charter, on its face, generally does not
restrict an association's traditional power to limit membership as it
pleases.
However, there is good cause to look beyond the face of the charter to find a duty to refrain from invidious discrimination in selecting
members. A federal charter is a federal statute, and as such must be
read in light of Congress's avowed acclamatory purpose in granting a
charter and its strong declarations against discrimination in other
contexts. Given the close scrutiny that characterizes the chartering
process, and the supposed exemplary nature of the chartered bodies,
an implied_ prohibition against discrimination that violates federal
public policy, and is thus presumably contrary to the national interest, may be the only interpretation of the charter that fully expresses
congressional intent.52
49. 244 Ala. at 556, 14 S.2d at 227-28:
[T]hough certain service men may be eligible to membership under the Act of
Congress creating the organization, the corporation itself .Q.as the right to determine • • • whether or not any person may be elected to membership in the
respects indicated in its Constitution and By-laws.
[Furthermore, even if the applicant meets the additional requirements of the
Constitution and By-laws,] membership therein is not an absolute right, • • •
the respective posts have the authority to refuse an application for a post or
for membership therein. • • •
50. 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 278 App. Div. 757, 75
· N.Y;S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 877, 77 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1948),
51. 189 Misc. at 1055, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 347. The suggestion in Reiter that member,
ship policies are subject to a public policy limitation must be considered in light
of the fact that Reiter was an expulsion case. That the public policy caveat wo?ld
gi:ant a right to membership in exclusion cases is problematic. See text accom}>anymg
notes 38-41 supra. Perhaps Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc., 34 N.J, 582,
170 A.2d 791 (1961) offers support for such a proposition. See text accompanyi~g
notes 44-46 supra. Even if public policy does afford a right to membership in certam
instances, however, the right would not be as broadly applicable as the statutory
right discussed in this section of the Note.
52. Such a reading would not unconstitutionally infringe the freedom of association
of members of the chartered group. Cf. Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88
(1945); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1165-68 (D.D.C.), affd, sub nom. Coit v,
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607 (Me,
1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 924 (1973).
The need to interpret a charter may arise not only where a party contends that
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The extent of congressional scrutiny is evident in the high standards a group must meet before it will receive a federal charter.
Prior to 1969, Congress had no express requirements for incorporation. Nevertheless, the congressional debates and committee reports
relating to the grant of charters give some indication of the selectivity
with which charters were granted and the factors that impressed
Congress. Particularly favored were groups with ~'patriotic, fraternal,
historical, and educational [purposes]-all in keeping with the highest traditions of the American heritage," 63 "character building organization[s]"64 emphasizing "democratic methods and procedures,'' 55
groups with "national stature,'' 56 and groups that were "nonpolitical,
nonsectarian, ... [and open to all] regardless of economic status, race,
or creed." 57 The ad hoc nature of federal incorporation, however, led
to discontent and increased pressure to adopt more ·selective and
clearly defined criteria. This dissatisfaction resulted in occasional
mass rejections of charter requests, 58 attempts at adopting more
the charter prohibits discrimination, but also where one of the parties claims that
the charter mandates discrimination. For example, a plaintiff seeking membership in
a chartered group may assen that the charter compels his -exclusion, thus providing
the basis for a governmental action claim. See Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473
(D.D.C. 1972), revd., No. 73-1197 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974) (for further discussions, see
note 97 infra and accompanying text). Or the organization may argue that the charter's mandate preempts a state law forbidding discrimination. See National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., Docket No. A-1313-73, (N.J. Super.
CL, App. Div., March 29, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 10588, N.J. Sup. Ct., May 7,
1974, discussed in note 14 supra.
53. 104 CoNG. REc. 12230 (1958) (remarks of Congressman Vursell.)
54. S. REP. No. 1321, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950) (recommending incorporation of
the Girl Scouts) {hereinafter GIRL SCOUT REPORT].
_
55. Id. at 2.
56. S. REP. No. 1154, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964) (recommending incorporation
of the Little League).
57. GIRL SCOUT REPOR'l', supra note 54, at 2.
58, For example, no charter bills were reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee betlveen 1942 and 1946, apparently because of a concern that Congressional recognition not be abused. See Hearings on Corporation Charter Bills Before a Subcomm. of 'the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1946). See also 104 CONG.
REc. 12217 (1958) (remarks' of Congressman Celler):
The issue of corporate charters involves troublesome and difficult considerations
which plague the Committee on the Judiciary year after year. Every member of
that committee and most members of the House have been subjected to varying
degrees of pressure by a multitude of groups seeking Federal corporate ·charters.
Congress has already granted about 26 such charters to various organizations
and yet the demand and the pressures continue. During the 84th and 85th
Congresses alone, 33 different organizations have sought Federal charters from
this House. Where do we draw the line? Many of these groups have meritorious
purposes. To grant a charter to one and not to another is to invite the accusation of favoritism. To grant charters to all is to dilute the value and prestige
· of the Federal charter to anyone•
• • • The result is that Congress continues to create corporate bodies which
may then go about their business very much as they please. I submit that in
view of these facts Congress should exercise its power to grant corporate charters
most sparingly and most prudently.

1274

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1265

formal requirements, 119 a law requiring annual audits of private cor•
porations with federal charters, 60 and ultimately President Johnson's
veto of a proposed charter. 61 Finally, in 1969, responding to President
Johnson's suggestion that charters be granted only on a "selective
basis" to groups that meet a "national interest standard," 62 subcommittees of the House and Senate agreed to formal standards for
granting federal charters.63 The standards require that the group be
nonpartisan, nonprofit, and operated "solely for charitable, literary,
59. See SENATE Cm,IM. ON nm JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHING AND EFFECTUATING A POLICY
REsPECT TO THE CREATION OR CHARTERING OF CERTAIN CORPORATIONS DY ACT OF
CONGRESS, S. REP. No. 30, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
60. Act of Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-504, §§ 1-3, 78 Stat. 635 (codified at 36
u.s.c. §§ 1101-03 (1970)).
61. MEssAGE FROM nm PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 292, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (vetoing a bill to incorporate the Youth Council on Civic
Affairs). President Johnson stated:
For some tinle I have been concerned with the question of whether we were
granting Federal charters to private organizations on a case-by-case basis without
the benefit of clearly established standards and criteria as to eligibility. Worthy
civic, patriotic, and philanthropic organizations can and do incorporate their
activities under State law. It seems obvious that Federal charters should be
granted, if at all, only on a selective basis and that they should meet some
national interest standard.
Other questions indicate the desirability of further study of this matter.
For example, does the granting of Federal charters to a limited number of or•
ganizations discriminate against similar and worthy organizations and possibly
stifle their growth? Should federally chartered corporations be more carefully
supervised by an agency of the Federal Government? Does Federal rather than
State chartenng result in differences in the legal or tax status of the corporation,
and are any differences appropriate ones?
Id. at 1-2.
62. See note 61 supra.
63, HOUSE COM?>I, ON TilE JUDICIARY, 91ST COJ.IIG,, 1ST SESS,, STANDARDS FOR THE
GRANTING OF FEDERAL CHARTERS (Comm. Print 1969):
STANDARDS FOR THE GRANTING OF FEDERAL CHARTERS
(Agreed to jointly by Subcommittee No. 4 of the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of ~epresentatives, and the Subcommittee on Federal Charters,
Holidays, and Celebrations of the Committee of the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate).
In considering proposals for the granting of Federal charters, the following mimmum standards will be applied:
Any private organization petitioning Congress for the purpose of obtaining
the status of a Federal corporation shall be required to demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the Congress that it is an organization which is(1) operating under a charter granted by a State or the District of Columbia
and that it has so operated for a sufficient length of time to demonstrate
its activities are clearly in the public interest;
(2) of such unique character that chartering by the Congress as a Federal
corporation is the only appropriate form of incorporation;
(3) organized and operated solely for charitable, literary, educational, scientific,
patriotic, or civic improvement purposes;
(4) organized and operated as a nonpartisan and non-profit organization; and
(5) organized and operated for the primary purpose of conducting activities
which are of national scope and responsive to a national need, which need
cannot be met except upon the issuance of a Federal charter.
The meeting of the minimum standards as set forth by any private corporation
shall not
(1) be considered as justification in itself for the granting of a Federal charter;
or
(2) preclude or limit the Congress from imposing additional criteria or stan•
dards with respect to the granting of a charter to any organization.
WITH
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educational, scientific, patriotic, or civic improvement purposes," and
that its primary purpose be to conduct activities that are "clearly in
the public interest," of "national scope," and "responsive to a national need, which need cannot be met except upon the issuance of
a Federal charter." 64
Although the close congressional scrutiny evident in the new
standards does not, in itself, imply a legislative intent to prohibit
discrimination, the reason for the scrutiny-to ensure that charters
are grant<rd only to groups worthy of official acclaim-does imply
such an intent. Senator Hruska summarized the reason for granting
charters: "Very simply put, if the Congress enacts legislation granting
a Federal charter to a nonprofit organization it-confers on t!J.at organization mainly one benefit; that is, the prestige of setting out on
their [sic] letterhead that it has been granted a Federal charter by
act of Congress." 65 Hruska's perception of legislative intent in granting a charter is well documented in reports recommending incorporation of particular groups. Thus, the Senate report introducing the
Girl Scout bill states: "Because Congressional Charters are granted
as marks of distinction to organizations whose public service is unique
in scope and value, the friends of Girl Scouting believe that the
deserved prestige of such a charter should be conferred on the Girl
Scouts of the U.S.A." 66 • Other reports contain such statements as
"the granting of a Federal charter would be an appropriate recognition of the national stature which Little League has attained and
will encourage its further development ..." 67 and "[t]he organization
will also acquire the respect and stature which accrue only to organizations with congressional recognition." 68 In short, a federal charter is a declaration that a group serves the public interest, is of
national scope, and is worthy of setting out on its letterhead a. congressional mark of distinction. Invidious discrimination by such a
group is surely contrary to congressional intent, and argues for the
recognition of an implied prohibition against discrimination that is
repugnant to federal public policy.
An implied prohibition also finds support in · the legislative
history of several charter grants. In discussing the proposed incorporation of the Girl Scouts in 1950, Congress noted that the organization was "nonsectarian and ... open to all ... regardless of economic
64. See note 63 supra.
65. Hearings on S. 902, S. 913, S. 1281, S. 2337, S. 2509, and S. 2529 Before the

Subcomm. on Federal Charters, Holidays, and Celebratio~ of the Senate Comm. on
the Judidary, 92d Cong., 1st Sessi 69 (1971) (remarks of Senator Hruska) [hereinafter
1971 Senate Hearings].
66. GIRL SCOUT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2.

67. S. REP. No. 1154, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1964).
68. S. REP. No. 92-323, .92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971).
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status, race, or creed." 69 On another occasion it was noted that the
Veterans of World War I was open to "any American citizen •.•
who has been honorably discharged." 7° Concern over discrimination
by chartered groups was clearly e:xpressed in the debate over the
incorporation of the Jewish War Veterans. Responding to objections
that a charter should not be granted to a group open only to Jews,
the Senate Judiciary Report and various congresspersons repeatedly
observed that the proposed bill "does not call for a charter to a membership organization; the bill is in the nature of a charter to a memorial . . . . [T]here is a definite distinction between the two." 71 The
speakers apparently agreed that a membership organization would be
granted a federal charter only if it were open to "all veterans, regardless of race, color, or creed.'' 72
Additional support for the recognition of an implied statutory
prohibition against discriminatory membership policies may, in
many cases, be found in the charter provisions setting forth the
purposes of the incorporated group. The Marine Corps League
charter, for instance, states a purpose of "fit[ting] its members for
the duties of citizenship and encourag[ing] them to serve .•. ably
as citizens.'' 73 The charter of the United States Olympic Committee
states purposes of "instill[ing] and develop[ing] •.. the qualities of
... tolerance, and like virtues; and ... promot[ing] and encourag[ing]
the ... moral ... and cultural education of the youth of the United
States to the end that their ... patriotism, character, and good citizenship may be fully developed.'' 74 Such noble purposes are incapable of
precise definition, but they arguably foreclose membership practices
that are at odds with federal public policy. The court in In re Gallaher v. American Legion75 relied in part on such reasoning to strike
down a Legion regulation that was found "out of harmony with the
noble ideals for which [that] fine organization was founded.'' 70
69. GIRL SCOUT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2.
70. 104 CONG, REc. 12224 (1958) (remarks of Congressman Lane).
71. 104 CONG. REc. 18195 (1958) (remarks of Senator Dirksen). See also S. REP. No.
2420, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958) ("It is to be noted that [the bill] does not grant a
Federal charter to the membership organization • • , but rather is limited to the
national memorial.'').
72. 104 CONG. REc. 18195 (1958) (remarks of Senator Hickenlooper).
78. 86 U.S.C. § 57a (1970).
74. 36 u.s.a. § 373 (1970).
75. 154 Misc. 281, 277 N.Y.S. 81 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 242 App. Div. 60,i, 271
N.Y.S. 1012 (1934).
76. 154 Misc. at 285, 277 N.Y.S. at 85. See text accompanying notes 36,37 supra.
See also Reiter v. American Legion, 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), affd.
mem., 273 App. Div. 757, 75 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 273 App. Div. 877, 77
N.Y.S.2d 391 (1948), in which the court looked to several federal statutes to decide
whether the Legion could exclude communists without violating the charter's mandate that the organization be "nonpolitical.''
The ultra vires doctrine, which establishes that acts transcending a corporation's
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Finally, an implied prohibition against discrimination is suggested
by the serious constitutional problems raised in its absence. 77
Recognition of an implied statutory prohibition is only a first
step in deciding a given case; the nature of the prohibition remains
to be determined, with the attendant difficulty of assessing federal
public policy with respect to various private discriminations. Several
recent tax cases illustrate the use of federal policy in construing
statutes and the delicate balancing involved in reading statutes to
forbid discrimination by private groups.
In Green v. Connally,78 a three-judge district court held that private racially restrictive schools were not "charitable" under section
50l(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, defining tax-exempt organizations, and section l 70(c), allowing deductions for certain charitable
contributions. After discussing whether an educational institution
that practices racial discrimination could qualify as a charitable trust
under the common law of trusts, the court concluded that the proper
interpretative guide was federal public policy, not the common law:
Taking into account the sensitive and crucial nature of the issue
of racially discriminatory schools and the existence ... of a federal
policy derived from Congressional enactment as well as the Constitution itself, it is our conclusion that the ultimate criterion for
determination whether such schools are eligible under the "charitable" organization provisions of the Code rests not on a common
law referent but on that Federal policy.79

Assessing the federal policy against race discrimination, Judge
Leventhal first pointed to the thirteenth amendment's authorization
of congressional legislation "abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery," 80 noting that the amendment applies to privately, as well
as publicly, imposed badges. He then cited Brown v. Board of Education81 and its progeny as evidence of a broad policy against discrimienumerated powers are without effect, is the technical underpinning of this line of
argument. Though the movement to virtually unlimited corporate powers has diminished the importance of ultra vires as a business corporation theory, it ''has a
continuing vitality in the realm of the nonprofit corporations where purposes are
central to the whole concept." Moody, Nonprofit Corporations-A Survey of Recent
Cases, 21 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 26, 39 (1972). See, e.g., Bajdek v. Board of Trustees of
the Am. Legion Pulaski Post No. 357 Trust, 132 Ind. App. 116, 173 N.E.2d 61 (1961);
Wing Memorial Hosp. Assn. v. Town of Randolph, 120 Vt. 277, 141 A.2d 645 (1957).
77. Cf. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 tJ.S. 192 (1944). See Part
IV infra. It should be noted that these arguments do not apply to state incorporation.
State charters are freely granted and are not "badges of acclaim"; they are intended
only to allow the use of the corporate form. Furthermore, state incorporation of
discriminatory groups raises no constitutional problems. See text accompanying notes
166-73 infra.
78. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
79. 330 F. Supp. at 1161.
80. 330 F. Supp. at 1163, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
.

1278

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:1265

nation in public schools and several congressional enactments as
indicative of a policy against federal support for discriminatory
private schools. However, he was careful to consider competing
policies before concluding that the challenged provisions of the tax
code did not apply to racially discriminatory schools:
This principle [of construing the Internal Revenue Code so as not
to contravene federal public policy] cannot be applied without taking into account that as to private philanthropy, the promotion of a
healthy pluralism is often viewed as a prime social benefit of general
significance.... This decentralized choice-making is arguably more
efficient and responsive to public needs than the cumbersome and
less flexible allocation process of government administration.
The indulgence of individual whim or preference has values but
like all principles it cannot be pushed beyond sound limits to extremes that cannot be approved.... We are persuaded that there is
a declared Federal public policy against support for racial discrimination in education which overrides any assertion of value in practicing private racial discrimination, whether ascribed to philosophical
pluralism or divine inspiration for racial segregation.B2

The following year another three-judge court construed the
charitable deduction and exemption provisions of the Internal Revenue Code as applied to racially discriminatory fraternal orders. The
court in McGlotten v. Connally 83 again looked to the thirteenth
amendment and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 84 to find a constitutional policy against public and private race discrimination. It then
turned to what it termed "an analogous area," 811 section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of I 964,86 prohibiting racial discrimination by those
receiving federal financial assistance, and found a "clearly indicated
-Congressional policy that the beneficiaries of federal largesse should
not discriminate."87 Thus, it concluded, "this overriding public policy
.•. requires that the Code not be construed to allow the deduction
of contributions to organizations which excluded nonwhites from
membership." 88
82. 330 F. Supp. at 1162-63.
83. 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972).
84. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
85. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
87. 338 F. Supp. at 460.
88. 338 F. Supp. at 460. The McGlotten court discussed two other theories leading
to the same result: (I) The tax benefits constituted federal "subsidies" that if granted
to a racially restrictive fraternal order would violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment (see text accompanying notes 152·59 infra); (2) the tax benefits
resulted in violations of § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1970), prohibiting discrimination in "any program or activity receiving Federal finan•
dal assistance."
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McGlotten, although providing support for the use of federal
public policy as a tool of statutory interpretation, illustrates the
difficulty in accurately assessing that policy. Professors Bittker and
Kaufman criticize the decision for failing to consider associational
rights of purely private clubs and for failing to ·mention section 201
(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 196489 and section 807 of the Civil
Rights Act of ~968,90 which expressly exempt private clubs from prohibitions against discrimination in public' accommodations and federally financed housing.91 Apparently, Bittker and Kaufman
do not dispute the existence of a policy against federal support of
race discrimination; their criticism is directed to the court's failure
adequately to consider competing concerns for freedom of association. By overlooking those instances in which Congress weighed its
concern for civil rights against interests of private clubs and struck
a balance in favor of the latter, the McGlotten court undervalued
the express legislative interest in preserving private rights of association. The undervaluation is particularly serious when the result of
the implied statutory prohibition has a significant impact on private
rights. Clearly, then, the distress of Professors Bittker and Kaufman
results from their belief that excluding discriminatory organizations
from the special tax status provisions forces the organizations to pay
too high a price for their right to associate as they please.92
The assessment of federal public policy is less difficult in federal
charter cases than in the context of construing the Internal Revenue
Code. The constitutional and statutory referents relied upon by the
McGlotten court are still relevant to show an antidiscriminatory
policy, but a court may also be guided by explicit congressional
expressions against discrimination in the federal charter context.93
More significantly, reading federal charters to prohibit certain discrimination does not result in as heavy an impact on associational
freedoms as results in the tax cases. While an organization must
make the same choice-governmental benefit or discriminatory
practices-the price for choosing to discriminate is less severe.
Relinquishment of a charter is much less likely to endanger the
group's survival.than is forfeiture of "charitable" status under the
income tax laws.94 Thus, though an implied statutory prohibition
against discrimination must be separately considered for different
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
90. 42 u.s.c. § 3607 (1970).
91. Bittker &: Kaufman, Taxes and Civil Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal
Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 76-78 (1972).
92. Bittker &: Kaufman, supra note 91, at 86.
93. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
94. See text accompanying notes 145-47 infra.
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types of discrimination and different charters,00 it may be justified
even by a relatively weak expression of federal policy.
95. An implied prohibition against racial discrimination is the easiest case, The
strength of the public policy against racism is indicated by the thirteenth, fourteenth,
and fifteenth amendments, and by statutes forbidding racial discrimination in public
education, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 401-10, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1970);
federally assisted programs, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C, § 2000d (1970):
public accommodations, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C, § 2000a (1970);
public facilities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (1970); employment
opportunities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970):
and housing. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (1970). Moreover, Congress has specificaUy dis•
approved of racial discrimination by federally chartered groups. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra. Although there are situations in which Congress has expressly
refused to prohibit discrimination by private groups (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(e),
e(b)(2), 3607 (1970), exempting private clubs from statutes prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations, employment opportunities, and federally financed housing),
the weight of the policy, especially where associational interests would not be dras•
tically infringed, supports the implied statutory prohibition,
Religious discrimination presents allllost as compelling a case. The policy of
separation of church and state is of course arr integral part of the first amendment,
and religious discrimination is prohibited under most of the provisions of the civil
rights legislation cited above. However, competing concerns-respect for associational
freedoms and the free e.xercise of religion-have also been recognized by Congress,
In addition to the private club exemptions mentioned above, religious enterprises
are exempted from equal employment provisions with respect to the employment of
individuals of particular religions to perform work connected with the carrying on
of their activities, Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 702, 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-1 (1970); the
fair housing statute is not applicable to dwellings owned or operated by religious
groups for noncommercial purposes (unless the religion restricts membership on the
basis of race, color, or national origin), 42 U.S.C, § 3607 (1970); and the prohibition
of sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs is not applicable to
institutions controlled by religious organizations if compliance would be inconsistent
with religious tenets, 20 U.S.C.A. § 168I(a)(3) (Supp, 1974). Such e.xceptions, however,
indicate at most a tolerance for religious discrimination insofar as it furthers the
purposes of religious groups. If this is not the case-if, for example, the Boy Scouts
require a belief in God as a precondition of membership (see text accompanying notes
12-13 supra)-an implied prohibition against religious discrimination falls clearly
within federal public policy. Again, the minimal impact of the prohibition upon
associational and free exercise rights is significant.
Sex discrimination presents the hardest case, because of a weaker c....:pression 0£
federal policy. Nevertheless, "Congress has . • , manifested an increasing sensitivity
to sex-based classifications." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973). Thus,
sex discrimination is prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)(2)(a)-(d) (1970); under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970); and most recently under 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-86 (Supp. 1974), pm•
hibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted educational programs. Furthermore,
Congress has passed and submitted to the states for ratification the Equal Rights
Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess, (1972), which declares that
"[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex." The foregoing enactments have led four
members of the Supreme Court to state that "Congress itself bas concluded that
classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, •• ," Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973). Despite the growth of this policy, some sex discrimination
is carried on with congressional approval. Colleges that have "traditionally and
continually" admitted students of one sex are exempted from antidiscriminatory
requirements for federally assisted educational programs. 20 U.S.C.A. § 168l(a)(6)
(Supp. 1974). Furthermore, Congress approved a "separate but equal" philosophy by
granting a federal charter to the Girl Scouts with an expressed purpose of "giv[ing]
the same prestige to the girls of America as has been given to the boys." 96 CoNC, REc,
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IV, GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
Many discriminatory membership practices that raise substantial
constitutional questions may be dealt with by an implied statutory
prohibition. However, there are situations in which a prohibition cannot be read into a charter, making the constitutional issues unavoidable. One such situation involves charters that expressly mandate
discrimination. The charter of the Sons of Union Veterans of the
Civil War, for example, restricts membership eligibility to "male
blood relatives" of union soldiers,96 and the charters of the Little
League and the VFW arguably restrict membership to males.97
Similarly, a charter expressly reserving to an organization the power
to select members on the basis of race or national origin, for example,
would resist the statutory analysis suggested above, although it is
improbable that such a charter would be granted. Finally, even a·
charter that is silent on membership restrictions may not be susceptible to the statutory analysis if granted to an organization with a clear
history of discrimination.98 If constraints on membership. policies are
to be found in these situations they must derive from the Constitution.
The relevant constitutional provision-the fifth amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable discrimination99-applies only to govem1812 (1950) (remarks of Representative Norton). Nevertheless, though an implied
prohibition against se.x discrimination may not be justified for all federally chartered
groups, distinctions may be made. For example, veterans groups, in contrast to the
Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts, have a sexually neutral purpose, and Congress has expressed the concern that they be open to all. See text accompanying notes 70-72
supra. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to read an implied prohibition against
sex discrimination into the charters of such groups as the VFW.
96. 36 u.s.c. § 535 (1970).
97. The Little League charter states, in part: "The objects and purposes of the
corporation shall be ••• [t]o promote, develop, supervise, and voluntarily assist in
all lawful ways the interest of boys who will participate in Little League baseball••••
To help and voluntarily assist boys in developing qualities of citizenship, sportsmanship, and manhood." Act of July 16, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-378, § 3, 78 Stat. 325
(emphasis added). But see National Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball,
Inc., Docket No. A-1313--73 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div.), appeal docketed, No. 10588,
N.J. Sup. Ct., May 7, 1974. The VFW charter states: "No person shall be a member
of this corporation unless he has served honorably as an officer or enlisted man
in the Armed Forces of the United States of America ••••" 36 U.S.C. § 115 (1970)
{emphasis added), But see Stearns v. VFW, 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), revd. on
other grounds, No. 73--1197 (D.C. Cir, June 19, 1974), where the court found the VFW
charter ambiguous, and held that "[t]he use of the pronoun 'he' and the words
'enlisted man' cannot reasonably be construed to be anything more than grammatical
imprecision ••••" 353 F. Supp. at 475. The court noted that the VFW itself did not
feel constrained by the charter; it had voted on (but defeated) an amendment to its
constitution that would have allowed the admission of females. 353 F. Supp. at 476.
98. However, it may still be possible to construe the charter to prohibit the discrimination. One may argue that clear congressional pronouncements against similar
discrimination in other areas should be given decisive weight unless Congress specifically provides otherwise.
99. Although the fifth amendment contains no explicit equal protection guarantee
against actions by the federal government, such a guarantee has been found implicit
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ment actions. Thus, "private conduct abridging individual rights
d~es no violence to the [right to equal protection] unless to some
significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been
found to have become involved in it." 100 When there is sufficient
involvement, the activities of the private party are "tantamount to
governmental action,"101 so that either the actor is bound by constitutional prohibitions or the government must disengage itself.102
in the concept of "due process." See, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964)
("[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.'') Accorcl,
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 n.5 (1973). Although the Court has never
expressly declared that the fifth amendment equal protection guarantee exactly
parallels the equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment, fifth amend•
ment cases freely use fourteenth amendment precedent. See, e.g., United States Dept,
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
100. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. '115, 722 (1961). See also
Public Util. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
101. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
133 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring). Although different criteria may be relevant when
considering federal action as opposed to state action, the cases do not make this
distinction. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972): Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action cases) with Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Public Util.
Commn. v. Pollak, 348 U.S. 451 (1952) (federal action cases).
102. This Note will discuss only the involvement that inheres in the grant of a
federal charter per se. Other factors may be relevant and should be considered in
particular cases. In the Little League cases, for example, a finding of state action is
given added support by the group's use of public school fields and other municipal
facilities. Also, many chartered groups enjoy favorable tax status under the income
tax laws. See Stearns v. VFW, No. 73-1197, slip op. at 3-4 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974),
The Note will also discuss governmental action only with respect to equal protection
rights against discriminatory membership policies. Although the issue is not settled,
cases suggest that different degrees of governmental involvement are necessary to
activate different constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School,
- 478 F.2d 1137, 1142 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving due process rights in an c.'Cpulsion from
a private law school): "[W]hile a grant or other index of state involvement may be
impermissible when it 'fosters or encourages' discrimination on the basis of race, the
same limited involvement may not rise to the level of 'state action' when the action
in question is alleged to affront other constitutional rights." See also Jackson v.
Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. 2747-50 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974); Pitts
v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 668-69 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Comment, Ta~
Incenfives as State Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 414, 445-47 (1973). Due process rights in
the charter context are in any case largely unnecessary; similar rights, which do not de•
pend on governmental action, have evolved under the common law. See text accompanying notes 17-35 supra. Although the state action requirement is unclear in due
process cases, it is clear that greater govenunental involvement is required to invoke
the establishment clause than the equal protection clause, as indicated in Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973):
(T]he transcendent value of free religious c.'Cerdse in our constitutional scheme
leaves room for "play in the joints" to the extent of cautiously delineated secular
governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such assistance
touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly bcne•
fiting the religious schools and their sponsors.
In contrast, although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places
no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise
Clause.
An establishment of religion claim, however, is unlikely to arise in the charter context,
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If a federal charter mandates the challenged discrimination a
finding of governmental action is almost axiomatic. The Supreme
Court has explicitly held that "a State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its law, has
compelled the act." 103 If the governmental action were then held to
violate a substantive constitutional restraint the court would probably declare the charter invalid insofar as it mandated the discrimination and enjoin its future enforcement.104 In Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis10 u the Court even enjoined enforcement of a liquor license
regulation that required the licensee to adhere to all the provisions
of its own constitution and bylaws. Acknowledging that the regulation was neutral on its face, the Court held that applying it to a
licensee whose bylaws required discrimination would result in invoking the sanctions of the state to enforce a discriminatory private
rule.100 Such an injunction in a federal charter case .would have little
impact on an excluded applicant's chances for membership. After the
invalid provision is stricken, the group would be free to retain its
charter and continue discriminating on its own volition.107 If this
future discrimination is to be restricted, it is necessary to ask whether
the grant of a federal charter per se is sufficient to subjec~ a chartered
group to constitutional restraints.
If a charter does not directly compel discrimination (either
because it is neutral on its face or because its command to discriminate will not be enforced) its constitutional significance is difficult
tG assess. Few cases deal with the issue. In Reiter v. American
Legion,1°8 the plaintiff was expelled from the Legion because of his
affiliation with the Communist Party. He argued that the expulsion
infringed upon his freedom of speech, but the court noted that the
because Congress has been reticent to charter religious membership groups. See text
accompanying notes 71-72 supra. Furthermore, religious discrimination by a nonsectarian group, such as the Boy Scouts, is probably better analyzed as an equal protection case than as an establishment clause case.
103. Adickes v. S. H. Kress&: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). However, whether or not
a charter mandates discrimination may be a litigable issue. See note 97 supra. The
state is also responsible where it merely authorizes or encourages discrimination. See
Norwood v. Harrison, 143 U.S. 455, 465 (1973); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
'
104. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress&: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
105. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
106. 407 U.S. at 178-79.
107. Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970). Moose Lodge, by implication, weakens the argument tha~ the discriminatory charter, in effect, makes the group an irrevocable agent of the state. But 'cf.
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. at 2767 (2d Cir. April 5, 19'74)
(Friendly, J., dissenting); Bittker &: Kaufman, supra note 91, at 60.
108. 189 Misc. 1053, 72 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct.), afjd. mem., 273 App. Div. 757, 75
N.Y.S.2d 530 (1947), appeal denied, 278 App. Div, 877, 77 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1948).
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first amendment protects an individual only against governmental
action and concluded that "[t]he mere circumstance that The American Legion exists under a Federal charter, rather than as an un•
incorporated association, or as a State-incorporated membership
corporation, would seem without significance in this respect.'' 100
Reiter cannot be afforded great weight. Its analysis is conclusory and
it was decided in 1947, before the expansive development of modem
governmental action doctrine. The most recent case, Stearns v.
VFW, 110 is somewhat more helpful. The plaintiff, excluded from
the VFW because of her sex, argued that the grant of a federal
charter to the VFW "constitute[d] the kind of significant state
involvement in private discriminations that is violative of the equal
protection guarantee in the due process clause of the Fifth Amend•
ment."lll The district court responded " •.. it does not. Cf. Moose
Lodge No. 107 V'. Irvis ... ,"112 but the court of appeals reversed this
summary dismissal.113 Remanding the case for "further examina•
tion/' 114 the court urged consideration of the following factors, in
addition to the grant of the federal charter: the requirement of
presentations to Congress of annual reports of proceedings and audits
of finances; the VFW's entitlement to loans or gifts of condemned or
obsolete com~at material; its special federal income ta.x status as a
chatitable organization; and the authorization of the Administrator
of the Veterans Administration to recognize representatives of the
VFW for the purpose of prosecuting claims under laws administered
by the Veterans Administration, and the further authorization to
furnish office space to VFW representatives.115 While the court stated
that "we are inclined to agree that Congressional chartering alone
does not constitute significant go"\_"ernment involvement that triggers
due process guarantees,"116 all but two of the factors it suggested be
considered on remand are natural concomitants of federal chartering.111
Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is to examine the
governmental action doctrine as it has been developed by the Supreme Court. Where the alleged governmental action does not
mandate discrimination the Court has eschewed a rigid formula and
adopted a "sifting of facts and weighing of circumstances"118 analysis.
109. 189 Misc. at 1057, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
no. 353 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1972), revd., No. 73-II97 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974).
Ill. 353 F. Supp. at 475.
ll2. 353 F. Supp. at 476.
ll3. No. 73-1197 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 1974).
II4. No. 73-1197, slip op. at 4.
ll5. No. 73-ll97, slip op. at 3-4.
ll6. No. 73-1197, slip op. at 3 (emphasis original).
II7. See note 142 infra and accompanying text,
IIS. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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The Court's "sifting and weighing" gives recognition to two competing general principles. On the one hand, as Justice Brennan stated:
The state-action doctrine reflects the profound judgment that denials
of equal treatment ... are singularly grave when government has or
shares responsibility for them. Government is the ~ocial organ to
which all in our society lo_ok for the promotion of liberty, justice,
£air and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals
for social conduct. Therefore something is uniquely amiss in a society where the government, the authoritative oracle of community
values, involves itself in ... discrimination.110

On the other hand, the doctrine reflects a respect for individual
choice and a desire to protect genuinely private concerns. In the
words of Judge Friendly, "courts should pay heed, in testing £or government action, to the 'value of preserving a private sector free from
the constitutional requirements applicable to government institutions.' " 120
Two landmark Supreme Court decisions il!:ystrate the difficulty
in reconciling these principles. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,121 the Court held that racial discrimination in a privately
ovmed restaurant that leased space in a state agency's parking building was not so purely private as to be outside the scope of the fourteenth amendment. The factors the Court found relevant included
public ownership of the land and building and the use of public
fonds for its maintenance and upkeep, enjoyment of "mutual benefits" by the lessor and lessee (such as parking convenience for
restaurant guests and increased demand for parking because of the
restaurant), the fact that the discrimination created profits that were
indispensable elements in the financial success of the governmental
agency, and finally the fact that the state could have required its
tenant to discharge its responsibilities under the fourteenth amendment.122 The Court concluded that "[t]he State [had] so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the lessee] that
it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity," 123 thus subjecting the activity to the mandates of the
fourteenth amendment. Responding to the fear of "nigh universal
application" 124 of its holding, the Court was careful to point out
that its conclusions were not "universal truths on the basis of which
119. Adickes v. S. H. Kress &: Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. ;it 2771 (2d Cir. April 5,
1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting), quoting Wahba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102
(2d Cir. 1974).
121. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
122. 365 U.S. at 723-25.
123. 365 U.S. at 725.
124. 36!>
at 726,

u.s.
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every state leasing agreement is to be tested,"12is but rather were
limited to the manner and purpose of the leasing in the case as
presented.
Eleven years later, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 126 the Court
assessed the significance of a state's grant of a liquor license to ~
private club, and, in so doing, emphasized its concern with maintaining a line between private and governmental action:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an
otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection
Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at
all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree
whatever. Since state-furnished services include such necessities of
life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding
would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth in The Civil Rights Cases .••
and adhered to in subsequent decisions.1 27

Concluding that the grant of a liquor license and concomitant state
regulation did not make the Lodge's action governmental action,
the Court distinguished Burton by noting that in Moose Lodge there
was no "symbiotic relationship" or exchange of mutual benefits, the
land upon which the Lodge was situated was privately owned, the
Lodge had not proclaimed itself to be open to the public, and it
did not perform a function that "would otherwise in all likelihood
be performed by the State."128
Although Justice Douglas dissented, he too noted concern for a
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy,"120 and recognized that
the mere grant of a state permit would not make the recipient ipso
facto a public enterprise or undertaking, "any more than the grant
to a household of a permit to operate an incinerator puts the house-holder in the public domain."130 He was able to distinguish Moose
Lodge, however, by emphasizing an administrative requirement that
every liquor licensee comply with all of its own rules, including in
this case a discriminatory membership provision, and a state-enforced
scarcity of licenses that gave the holder a monopolistic advantage
both in selling liquor and ultimately in transferring the license.181
"Thus," he concluded, "the State of Pennsylvania is putting the
weight of its liquor license, concededly a valued and important
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
l;ll.

365
407
407
407
407
407
407

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 725.
163 (1972).
at 173.
at 175.
at 179.
at 180.
at 181-8;1,
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adjunct to a private club, behind racial discrimination." 182 Importantly, the majority and dissent disagreed primarily on their assessments of the facts-Justice Rehnquist had asserted that the quota ·
system fell "far short of conferring . . . a monopoly."133 Their conception of state action as a "sifting and weighing" of governmental
involvement versus private associational interests was the same.
Burton and Moose Lodge support the holding that a grant of a
federal charter is sufficient governmental involvement to impose
equal protection limitations on a recipient's membership policies.134
Such a holding is consistent with the principles behind the governmental action concept; the charter context presents clear indicia of
governmental involvement and a governmental action holding would
have few adverse effects on 'associational rights or private philanthropy. Moreover, a comparison of federal charters with other governmental benefits and regulation indicates that such a holding
would not threaten the distinction between public and private
action and, in fact, would go no further than present cases.
As in Burton and Moose Lodge, the government's action is
straightfonvard. Congress passes laws granting charters as "marks
of distinction,'' 135 so that the recipients may "acquire the respect
and stature which accrue only to organizations with congressional
recognition.''136 Furthermore, though prestige is the most significant
benefit of a federal charter, other advantages may exist. President
Johnson observed that the grant of a charter to one organization
may discriminate against similar organizations and possibly stifle
their growth.137 Also, in most states federal corporations are deemed
domestic as opposed to foreign for certain purposes, thus, for example, relieving them of the need to acquire authorizations to transact business.138
Benefits also flow to the government. Because chartered groups
are by definition organized "solely for charitable, literary, educational, scientific, or civic improvement purposes," 139 their activities
132. 407 U.S. at 183.
133. 407 U.S. at 177.
134. See note 102 supra.
135. GIRL SCOOT REPORT, supra note 54, at 2.
136. S. REP. No. 92-323, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971).
137. See note 61 supra.
138. See, e.g., Home Owner's Loan Corp. v. Stookey, 59 Idaho 267, 81 P.2d 1096
(1938); Lawn Sav. and Loan Assn. v. Quinn, 81 Ill. App. 2d 304, 225 N.E.2d 683
(1967); Severson v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 184 Okla. 496, 88 P.2d 344 (1939);
Dodson v. Home Owner's Loan Corp., 123 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1938). See
also Homan v. Connett, 348 Mo. 244, 152 S.W.2d 1053 (1941) (federal corporation
domestic and therefore not prohibited from acting as trustee in deed of trust or
other conveyance); Gould v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 176 App. Div. 818, 163 N.Y.S.
479 (1917) (federal corporation domestic and therefore not subject to attachment).
139. See note 63 supra.
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often substitute for services that are otherwise performed by govemment.140 The American National Red Cross, for instance, provides
disaster relief and wartime aid services that elsewhere are traditionally provided by the state. Congress expressly recognizes and
indeed requires a quid pro quo for the grant of a charter by specifying that the chartered grqup be "responsive to a national need, which
need cannot be met except upon the issuance of a Federal charter."141
One may characterize this flow of "mutual benefits" as a "symbiotic
relationship," such as was found in .Burton and lacking in Moose
Lodge.
Finally, it should be noted that there is some continuous congressional regulation in the audit of federally chartered nonprofit
corporations required to be submitted annually to Congress.142
The significance of this governmental involvement cannot, of
course, be assessed in the abstract. Before concluding that the
involvement is sufficient to invoke constitutional limitations, one
must consider the competing interests-in this case, a respect for the
140. Cf. Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D. Ore.
1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 U,S,
1099 (1973); Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 667 n.10 (E.D. Wis.
1971). See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
141. See note 63 supra.
142. 36 U.S.C. §§ 1101-03 (1970). Many federally chartered groups must also sub•
mit to Congress annual reports of their proceedings. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 28 (1070)
(Boy Scouts); 36 U.S.C. § 118 (1970) (VFW). Particular cases may have additional indicia of governmental involvement. See note 102 supra.
The argument may be made that the grant of a federal charter should not lead
to a holding of governmental action because there is an insufficient "nexus" between the governmental involvement and the discrimination. Cases involving challenges to the membership policies of otherwise private organizations indicate some
confusion regarding the exact nexus required. In Junior Chamber of Commerce v.
United States Jaycees (10th Cir. April 16, 1974) (excerpted in 112 U.S.L.W. 2570) the
court refused to find the Jaycees' discriminatory policy subject to constitutional con•
straints by virtue of the organization's administration of government funds. Although
acknowledging that a constitutional violation might exist if the money were dis•
tributed in a discriminatory manner, the court held that there was not a sufficient
nexus between the group's membership policy and the alleged state action, The court
in McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), however, rejected a similar
contention: ''We do not find lt significant that plaintiff does not allege ••• that
the charitable purposes to which the federal funds are put are in themselves discriminatory. Plaintiff alleges that he and others in his position are denied the oppor•
tunity to help determine the purposes to which the funds are devoted. Paternalism
should not be confused with equality." 338 F. Supp. at 456 n.38. Whatever the status
of the nexus requirement, it is met in the federal charter situation. The government
does not merely funnel money through private hands, in which case the only question
may be the nature of the activities so financed. By granting a federal charter Congress
selectively places its "stamp of approval" on a membership organization in its
entirety. Frequently, the main function of the organization is to benefit its own members; thus, when a group such as the Little League or the Boy Scouts selects its
members the beneficiaries of the government acclaim are defined. This would seem
to provide a sufficient nexus between the discriminatory activity and the governmental involvement. For a more general discussion of the nexus question, see COIi}·
went, supra note 102, ;it 4M-3P,
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right to associate freely and for the advantages of pluralistic philanthropy. Judge Friendly eloquently expressed this concern:
Philanthropy is a delicate plant whose fruits are often better than its
roots; desire to benefit one's own kind may not be the noblest of motives but it is not ignoble. It is the very possibility of doing something
different than government can do, of creating an institution free to
make choices government cannot-even seemingly arbitrary ones·without having to provide a justification that will be examined in a
court of law, which stimulates much private giving and interest. If
the private agency must be a replica of the public one, why should
private citizens give it their money and their time? The case is not
necessarily altered simply because government has decided to help
private institutions carry a load they are no longer able to bear alone;
rather, when the history of our time comes to be written, the development of techniques whereby privately managed universities,
hospitals and social agencies have been assisted to work in tandem
with state operated institutions will rank high for imagination and
results.143
Two important points emerge upon consideration of the interaction of the factors discussed above. First, the degree of governmental involvement and the benefit conferred in the grant of a
federal charter, though possibly of less weight than in Burton, still
seriously impair the government's stature as a model of justice and
equality. Because federal charters are granted only in exceptional
cases and for the primary purpose of bestowing acclaim, they imply
that Congress has "elected to place its power ... and prestige behind
the admitted discrimination" and "by its inaction ... has ... made
itself a party to the refusal"144 of membership. In other words, it is
not the group's private discrin1ination that offends fundamental
societal and constitutional values as much as the legitimization and
approval of the gr-0up that the federal charter represents.
Second, the considerations that argue against a governmental action holding are minimal. The Supreme Court has indicated generally
that infringement on associational freedom is not to be considered
decisive in governmental action cases: "[W]e must also be aware
that the very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve
to infringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrimination takes its
own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject to
affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action." 146
Moreover, regardless of the weight afforded the group's associational
interests, neither these interests nor society's interest in preserving
143. H. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAsE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE
30 (1969). See also Private Associations, supra note 22, at 986-90.
144. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, '725 (1961).
145. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 42 U.S.L.W. 4920 (U.S. June 17, 1974).
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pluralistic philanthropy are significantly impaired by a governmental
action holding. A group need only relinquish its charter in order to
restore its "purely private" character.146 Though a disentanglement
from governmental involvement may restore private status in many
contexts, the significant point in the federal charter situation is that
such disentanglement entails little cost. Groups seeking federal
charters are already incorporated; 147 thus, even after relinquishing
its federal charter, a group can continue to have the legal and economic advantages incorporation provides. The only price exacted
for the retention of discriminatory policies would be the loss of
congressional acclaim, a loss that, unlike the loss of a tax exemption,
for instance, does not impair a group's ability to pursue its philanthropic endeavors. In addition, no significant legitimate governmental objective in granting a charter is compromised by a conclusion
of governmental action, even if the charter is relinquished. The
primary purpose of bestowing acclaim is of course frustrated, but
it is the very objective of acclaiming a discriminatory group that
should be held impermissible. In contrast, much governmental involvement aims at promoting public health, safety, or welfare in a
manner that might be seriously compromised if the private party
were treated as an arm of the state. In Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 148 for example, plaintiffs
argued that, in light of the substantial governmental involvement
in the regulation of broadcast media, the CBS network should be
considered an agent of the state for the purpose of affording responsible individuals and groups a constitutional right to purchase advertising time to comment on public issues. Although there was no
majority decision on the governmental action claim,149 those who
opposed it were concerned with the fact that the objective of the
government regulation was "to maintain . . . essentially private
broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public interest
standards."150 A finding of governmental action would jeopardize
that objective because "[j]oumalistic discretion would in many ways
be lost to the rigid limitations that the First Amendment imposes on
govemmerit." 151
146. See note 107 supra.
147. Prior state incorporation is required of any group seeking a federal charter.
See note 63 supra. Thus, "[f]avorable consideration by the Congress and approval by
the President of a charter bill neither add to nor detract from the standing that
that organization had under its State charter." 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 65,
at 69.
148. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
149. Justices Brennan and Marshall found govemmental action. Justices Burger,
Stewart, and Rehnquist found no governmental action. Justices Blackmun, Powell,
White, and Douglas did not decide the question.
150. 412 U.S. at 120.
151. 412 U.S. at 121.
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The conclusion that the grant of a federal charter subjects the
recipient to constitutional restraints gains strong support from recent
cases finding "state a,ction" in the grant of favorable tax status to
racially discriminatory groups.152 The tax cases rely primarily on
two factors: official approval of the recipient groups153 and ·the
mutual benefits resulting from the groups' performance of charitable
152. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974)
(state and federal tax exemptions for private nonprofit foundations held state action);
Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973) (exemptions from state property and corporate excise taxes for the racially discriminatory
Elks Lodge held invalid under the equal protection clause); McGlotten ·v. Connally,
338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (upholding a constitutional challenge to the application
of Internal Revenue Code provisions for the deduction of charitable contributions
and the allowance of tax exempt status to racially discriminatory fraternal orders);
Pitts v. Department of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Wis. 1971). See generally
Comment, supra note 102. Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. &: Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (upholding establishment clause challenge to state grant of tax deductions for tuition payments to certain "nonpublic schools"). But see McCoy v. Schultz,
31 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d ,I 73--477 (D.D.C. 1973). Cf. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (disallowing an establishment clause challenge for tax exemptions to religious entities); Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States Jaycees (10th Cir. April
16, 1974) (excerpted in 42 U.S.L.W. 2570) (receipt of federal funds by private community organization for use in community welfare programs held not governmental
action); Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (state tax exemption does
not make private college "an arm of the State" subjecting it to due procei;s requirements in expelling students).
The relief sought in most of these cases was a withdrawal of government benefits
rather than an injunction of the discriminatory conduct. The McGlotten court found
no analytical difference: "[I1he determination of when state involvement is sufficient
either to bring otherwise private discrimination within the aegis of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment, or to evoke a duty on the part of the government to prevent that discrimination, has traditionally been styled one of 'state action.' Little
clarity is gained at this stage by attaching a different label to the same inquiry
depending on who is the defendant.'' 338 F. Supp. at 455 n.31. The court in Pitts,
however, suggested that "[t]his difference in posture may bear upon the weight to be
accorded to the prerogatives of private organizations in balancing them against the
rights asserted.'' 333 F. Supp. at 666. See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No.
73-1543, slip op. at 2766-67 (2d Cir. April 5, 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting from the
denial of reconsideration en bane): "A holding that an othenvise private institution
has become an arm of the state is much broader and can have far more serious
consequences than a determination that the state has impermissibly fostered private
discrimination." If, however, the result of a conclusion of governmental action in
either ·posture is to put the group to the choice of continuing to receive the governmental benefit or continuing to discriminate, it is difficult to see why the weighing
should be different.
153. See, e.g., Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 889 (D.
Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409
U.S. 1099 (1973): "Moreover, ORS 307.134(l)(c) requires the State, before granting an
exemption, to find that the fraternal organization engages in benevolent and
charitable activities 'with the purpose of doing good to others rather than for the
convenience of its members.' With this finding, Oregon places its stamp of approval
on the Elks Lodge as an organization that furthers the legislative policy of the
State.'' See also McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D.D.C. 1972) ("Thus
the government has marked certain organizations as 'Government Approved''') (emphasis original).
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functions. 154 Both factors are present in the charter context,1 Gli and,
more importantly, the charter context is not complicated by the
difficulties presented by the tax cases.
There aie tw'O significant distinctions. First, the tax cases deal
with a governmental benefit-the grant of tax exempt "charitable"
status under the Internal Revenue Code-that, unlike a federal
charter, does not-single out a specific group for acclaim and does not
have acclaim as its primary purpose. As Professors Bittker and Kaufman have noted, the Internal Revenue Code "is a pudding with
plums for everyone," 156 making it a difficult task to decide which of
the Code's many deduction and exemption provisions denote governmental approval of the activities of the recipient and which do not.11i 7
Moreover, finding governmental action in the ta.x cases more seriously
endangers "[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled
choice for private philanthropy"158 than would a similar conclusion
in federal charter cases. As noted earlier, Professors Bittker and
Kaufman believe that excluding discriminatory organizations from
the "charitable" provisions of the Code forces the groups to pay too
high a price for their rights of privacy and free association.1 G0 Indeed,
the denial of tax exempt status may mean the extinction of some
charitable groups, an effect unlikely to result from the renunciation
of a federal charter.
Finally, a conclusion of governmental action in federal charter
cases will not "utterly emasculate the distinction between private
as distinguished from State conduct." 160 Seemingly analogous situations, such as those involving state incorporation and licensing,
are distinguishable.101
154. See, e.g., Falkenstein v. Department of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887, 888 (D.
Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed sub nom. Oregon State Elks Assn. v. Falkenstein, 409
- U.S. 1099 (1973): "[T]ax exemptions for fraternal organizations benefit both the State
and the organizations. Oregon relieves fraternal organizations from the burden of
property and corporate excise taxes and, in return, the public benefits from the
charitable and benevolent activities of these organizations. This is the kind of 'sym•
biotic relationship' that was lacking in Moose Lodge ••••" See also Pitts v. Depart•
ment of Revenue, 333 F. Supp. 662, 667 n.10 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
155. See text accompanying notes 135-36, 139-41.
156. Bittker & Kaufman, supra note 91, at 86.
157. Judge Bazelon recognized this problem in McGlotten:
Every deduction in the ta.x laws provides a benefit to the class who may take
advant.age of it. And the withdrawal of that benefit would often act as a
substantial incentive to eliminate the behavior which caused the change in status,
Yet the provision of an income tax deduction for mortgage interest paid has not
been held sufficient to make the Federal Government a "joint participant" in the
bigotry practiced by a homeowner.
·
!!38 F. Supp. at 456 (footnotes omitted).
158. Jackson v. Statler Foundation, No. 73-1543, slip op. at 2771 (2d Cir, April
li, 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en bane),
159. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
160. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
161. The grant of a franchise to public utilities may also parallel the federal
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. The Supreme Court162 and several commentators163 indicate that
state licensing alone should not be held sufficient to place particular
constitutional limitations on the licensee. Unlike federal charters,
however, state licenses are not symbols of governmental acclaim but
are widely used means of regulating public health and safety; a
license will generally be granted to anyone willing to comply with
the requirements, be they adequate refrigeration and dish-washing
in a restaurant or satisfactory plumbing facilities in a home.164 Even
liquor licensing regulations requiring that the applicant be "a person
of good repute" and that the license not be "detrimental to the
,velfare, health, peace, and morals of the inhabitants of the neighborhood,"165 are intended more to protect the public from abuse of the
liquor laws than to see if an individual deserves the acclaim of the
state. Furthermore, licenses are typically not exclusive franchises
and do not confer monopolistic advantages. Finally, their pervasiveness in modern society, a fact that provokes the fear of "emasculating
the distinction" between public and private conduct, stands in
marked contrast to the limited number of federal charters.
State incorporation is also distinguishable. Nonprofit corporations face only the minimal requirements of being nonprofit166
and possibly of having a charitable, civic, or other social.purpose.167
Although all states require that the purposes of the corporation
not be contrary to law or to public policy,168 scrutiny of a requested
charter situation, but the duty not to discriminate in providing services is mandated
by the common law and does not depend on a governmental action theory. Recently,
however, a governmental action theory has been advanced to impose a due process
requirement on termination of services. See Note, Light a Candle and Call an Attar•
ney-The Utility Shutoff Cases, 58 IowA L. REv. 1161 (1973).
162. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
163. See, e.g., Karst 8c Van Alstyne, Comment: Sit-Ins and State Actions-Mr.
• Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762 (1962); Lewis, The Sit-In Cases:
Great Expectations, 1963 SuP. Cr. REv. 101, 116.
164. Karst 8c Van Alstyne, supra note 163, at 774-75 ("There is no magic to a
license from the government; it has none of the significance of governmental assistance ••• .'').
165 PA. STAT. tit. 47, § 4-404 (1951). This was the statute involved in Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
166. A nonprofit corporation is typically defined as a "corporation no part of the
income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors, or officers.''
ABA-ALI MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. Ac:r § 2c (rev. 1964).
167. See, e.g., id. § 4: (rev. 1964): "Corporations may be organized under this Act
for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or
more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational;
civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agriculturaP, horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial,
industrial or trade association • • • .'' An alternative provision would authorize
formation of a nonprofit corporation for "any lawful purpose.'' Id. alternative § 4:
(rev. 1964).
.
168. This is true of both profit and nonprofit corporations. See W. Fl.ETCHER,
CYCLOPEDL\ OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPOMTIONS § 93 (1963).
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charter does not vest state officials with the power to grant or deny
incorporation based on whether the purposes of the group merit an
official "stamp of approval." In In re Association for Preservation
of Freedom of Choice, Inc., 169 a New York trial court upheld the
denial of a charter that stated the corporation's purpose to be: "[t]o
promote the right to individual freedom of choice and freedom of
association, constituting the right of the individual to associate with
only those persons with whom he desires to associate.'' 170 The court,
finding that the group's purpose was to promote bigotry and thus
"should not be sanctioned by receiving the imprimateur of this
court," 171 was reversed by the New York court of appeals. Without
disagreeing with the lower court's characterization of the organization's activities,. the court of appeals defined public policy narrowly
and held that
the public policy of the State is not violated by purposes which are

not unlawful.
[Agitation to repeal laws or to change the form of government] is
not against public policy whether indulged in by an indivi'dual or a
membership corporation, but of course approval of a corporate charter devoted to such a purpose does not imply approval of the views of l
. its sponsors. It simply means that their expression is lawful, and
their sponsors entitled to a vehicle for such expression under a statute which cannot constitutionally be made available only to those
who are in harmony with the majority viewpoint. Dissenting organizations have equal rights, so far as freedom of expression is concerned, as any other groups, and are entitled to an equal and objective application of the statute.1 72

In short, state incorporation, like state licensing, does not bestow
acclaim. State charters are granted freely and governmental scrutiny
is limited and nondiscretionary. Congress, on the other hand, grants
few charters, strictly scrutinizes the social objectives of the group
seeking incorporation, and retains ultimate discretion even after its
standards are met.173 The conclusion that the grant of a federal
charter is sufficient governmental involvement to subject a group to
constitutional restraints is therefore easily kept within boundaries
that do not "utterly emasculate" the distinction between public and
private action.
169. 17 Misc. 2d 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1959), afjd. on rehearing, 18
Misc. 2d 534, 188 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1959), afjd., IO App. Div. 2d 873, 202 N,Y.S.2d 218
(1960), revd., 9 N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1962).
0
170. 17 Misc. 2d at 1012, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 706-07.
171. 17 Misc. 2d at 1013, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
172. 9 N.Y.2d at 382-83, 174 N.E.2d at 489-90, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92 (emphasis
added). See also In re Owles v. Lomenw, 38 App. Div. 2d 981, 329 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1972).
178. See note 63 supra.

May 1974]

Notes

1295

In conclusion, it should be remembered that a finding of governmental action does not ~nd the inquiry into the propriety of a
group's membership policies. A court must further consider whether
the challenged policies are proscribed by the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment. Equal protection analysis, however,
requires detailed consideration of the nature and justification for
the particular discrimination involved, and must therefore be left
for determination in individual cases.

